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We study how class size and class composition affect the academic and labor market performance
of college students, two crucial policy questions given the secular increase in college enrollment. Our
identification strategy relies on the random assignment of students to teaching classes. We find that
a one standard deviation increase in class-size results in a 0.1 standard deviation deterioration of the
average grade. Further, the effect is heterogeneous as it is stronger for males and lower income students.
Also, the effects of class composition in terms of gender and ability appear to be inverse U-shaped.
Finally, a reduction of 20 students (one standard deviation) in one's class size has a positive effect
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This paper estimates the eect on the grades and earnings of college students of two controversial
educational policies: reducing class size and changing the degree of student heterogeneity within a
class. The literature on the education production function nds inconsistent results of the eect of
class size on student achievement. For example, Angrist and Lavy (1999) and Krueger (1999) nd
a substantial positive eect of class size reduction, while Hanushek (1996) and Hoxby (2000) nd
no impact, a result that is also conrmed in the review of the literature by Hanushek (2006) and by
the experimental study of Duo et al. (2009) in Kenya.
The eect of class heterogeneity on performance is even less clear. Econometric complications
have largely prevented well-identied work on this issue (Manning and Pischke, 2006). Only by
using a purposely designed experiment, Duo et al. (2008) show that tracking according to ability
has positive eects on all students.
Estimating the causal impact of class size on student achievement is important from a policy
perspective because reducing class size for xed student population requires hiring more teacher-
hours, an expensive proposition. On the other hand, manipulating class composition may have
substantial eects on student achievement at much lower costs.
While most of the literature has focused on primary and secondary schools, we concentrate on
university students. We believe that focusing on post-secondary education is important for at least
two reasons. First, because of the dierence in students, professors, and pedagogy between secondary
and post-secondary education, results from pre-college academic settings may not be informative
for understanding educational interventions at universities. Moreover, there is little research on the
eect of class size on test scores in the post-secondary setting. Evidence of signicant negative eects
of class size on test scores has been presented only by Bandiera et al. (2008), Pinto Machado, and
Vera-Hernandez (2009), although in dierent settings and with dierent identication strategies
from ours. In addition, as the fraction of individuals attending college rises around the world,
estimates that refer directly to the production of higher education are likely to become more and
2more interesting to policy makers.1 In particular we are also able to explore the link between those
policies and labor market outcomes directly.
In this paper we exploit experimental variation in class size and class heterogeneity that arises
from random allocation of students to teaching classes at Bocconi University. Such allocation mecha-
nism was not adopted for research purposes but rather with the aim of encouraging wide interactions
among students. Nevertheless, as we discuss later on, the allocation is performed according to a
computerized random algorithm, as in a purposely designed experiment.
Besides the focus on higher education and the use of experimental variation, our work diers from
the bulk of the existing literature in a third dimension: our data includes information on the labor
market outcomes of the students in our sample. Thus, we are able to measure the direct wage eect
of class size and heterogeneity, both conditional and unconditional on academic performance. To our
knowledge this is the rst study to present such evidence, although Mott (1996) points out that a
separate strand of the school quality literature has indeed looked at earnings. For example, Johnson
and Staord (1973) and Card and Krueger (1992) nd substantial positive eects on earnings of
increasing expenditure per pupil. Dearden et al. (2002) nd that the pupil-teacher ratio has no
impact on educational qualications or on men's wages, but they do nd an eect on women's wages
at the age of 33, particularly those of low ability. Other papers in this area as Betts (1995), Heckman
et al. (1996) nd no signicant eects.
The policy relevance of the questions we ask is widely recognized. Since the Coleman Report
(1966), the discussion of improving students' performance has focused on reductions in class sizes
(Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hoxby, 2000) and, to a somewhat smaller extent, on changing the compo-
sition of students in a classroom.2 While the rst policy is costly, as it entails the hiring of extra
sta-hours, changing the composition of classes according to some underlying observable character-
istics of the students is an intervention that could be implemented at zero cost and still guarantee
1According to the US census, in 1940 4.6% of adults over 25 had a BA. By 2000, 24.4% held a BA. See
www.census.gov/population/socdemo/education/phct41/US.pdf for the full gures. On average in the OECD Coun-
tries 56% of school-leavers enrolled in tertiary education in 2006 versus 35% in 1995. The same secular trends appear
in non-OECD countries (OECD, 2008). Further, the number of students enrolled in tertiary education has increased
on average in the OECD countries by almost 20% between 1998 and 2006, with the US having experienced a higher
than average increase from 13 to 17 millions.
2The NBER working paper version of Hoxby (2000), (Hoxby, 1998), did actually analyze the eect of class compo-
sition and performance. See also Betts and Shkolnik (2000a, 2000b) and Duo et al. (2008) and the literature cited
therein.
3possibly large positive eects.
Our main results are that class size is an important determinant of student academic and labor
market performances. In our main specication, an increase of class size by one standard deviation,
or 20 students from a mean of 131, is associated with a reduction of the mean grade by about 1/3
of a grade point or about 0.14 of a standard deviation. Moreover, we nd that this eect does not
disappear when the size of the class becomes large, as we cannot reject the linear specication of
the class size eect. We nd that the eect is largest for males and for students from lower income
families. On the other hand, our results suggest no heterogeneity of the eect of class size across
students of dierent academic abilities.
When we explore the role of class heterogeneity on academic performance, we nd an inverse
U-shaped relation between the share of women in the classroom and academic performance. We
nd a similar, although less robust, relation in terms of heterogeneity in ability. The eects of
the gender and the ability composition of the class are non-linear and open up the possibility of
increasing academic performance by reshuing students into an optimal class allocation without
the need to invest in additional resources. We explore this issue in detail in Section 6.
Finally, although the eects of class size on labor market outcomes are less precisely estimated,
we nd that having experienced larger classes on average is associated with lower wages. Namely, our
point estimates suggest that increasing the average class size by 20 students reduces entry monthly
wages by 80 euros (approximately 115 USD net of taxes) or 6 percent. This is a very important
result, given the substantial impact of initial conditions in the labor market (Oyer, 2006). Our
baseline estimates imply that reducing class size is likely to be a very cost eective intervention.
Our rich data also allows us to explore the mechanism through which class size may inuence labor
market outcomes. Conditioning on academic performance reduces the magnitude of the link between
class size and earnings by a mere 10 percent, suggesting that class size aects labor market outcomes
in ways that are not fully captured by grades.
There are many dierent mechanisms that could link class size to learning, achievement, and
labor market performance. For example, smaller classes allow closer student-teacher interactions,
4and are subject to lower disruption levels (Lazear, 2001). In particular, if the eect is generated
by disruption, one would expect it not to fade away too rapidly as class size increases. It is also
plausible that teachers are able to target the educational content to the interests and abilities of
all students in a smaller class. However, when faced with a smaller class, teachers may provide
less eort, partly osetting the benets of a smaller class size (Duo et al., 2009). In addition, if
students learn from their peers, smaller classes may result in lower student achievement. Similar
contrasting arguments might be made regarding the students' composition of the classroom: while
it is plausible that a diverse student body has positive eects because of possible complementarities
in abilities and types, a very heterogeneous class also makes teaching as well as peer interactions
harder (Dobblesteen et al. (2002); Figlio and Page (2002); Duo et al. (2008)).
Our empirical results may shed new light on this issue and suggest which mechanisms are more
likely to be at work. For example, the linearity of the eect of class size on academic achievement
seems more consistent with a disruption mechanism than with teachers not being able to adjust
their teaching methods to the heterogeneity and size of the class. One important dierence between
college and school (either primary or high school) classes is their relative sizes. While in primary
and secondary schools, class size rarely goes above 50 in developed countries (although it might
be larger in the developing world (Duo et al., 2009)), our classes contain on average around 130
students with a standard deviation of 20. Signicant eects for such large classes are more likely
to be generated by disruption than by any other mechanisms. In fact, the ability of teachers to
adjust their teaching methods to student heterogeneity probably declines quickly with the size of
the class, and it seems implausible to expect large dierences in this dimension across classes above
70-80 students. We interpret our results as consistent with Lazear (2001).
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the institutional details of
Bocconi University and it also provides evidence on the random allocation procedures. Section 3
discusses the empirical strategy; Section 4 presents the results on academic performance and Section
5 the analysis of labor market outcomes. In Section 6 we present a simple model of optimal class
formation. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
52 Data and institutional details
We use data from the administrative archives of Bocconi University, an institution of higher
education located in Milan, Italy, that oers degree programs in Economics and Management. There
are three features of the data and the institutional setting that are crucial for our analysis.
First and most importantly for our identication strategy, the roughly 1,500 students in each of
the two cohorts that we consider were repeatedly randomly assigned to compulsory classes during
their rst, second, and part of their third academic years. Because classrooms are of dierent physical
sizes, the number of students in each class varies within both cohort and program. Moreover, the
random assignment of students generates variation in the amount of heterogeneity within a student's
group of classmates. Given the importance of the random variation in class size for our identication
strategy, we return to this issue in Section 2.2, where we provide evidence that teachers were also
(eectively) allocated randomly.
Second, the administrative data contains a wide array of student characteristics and outcomes
that are precisely measured. For each student, we have a wealth of information on her academic
curriculum, demographic and socio-economic characteristics. In addition, we have several pre-
enrollment variables such as high school leaving grade, type of high school, family income and
a good indicator of ability - a cognitive test score that all students take as part of the admission
procedure. These variables are important because they allow us to test for random allocation of
students into classes and to decompose the eect of the interventions by the predetermined charac-
teristics of the students. From the academic register, we have information on the grades obtained
by each student in each exam, which we use as our main outcome variable.
Finally, in addition to these administrative data, we also have access to a series of graduates'
surveys that cover all students after 1 to 1.5 years since graduation. These data allow us to un-
derstand how educational policies inuence labor market outcomes. These surveys collect detailed
information on the labor market trajectories of the former students. In Section 2.3 we describe the
graduates' surveys in more detail.
In our analysis, we focus on two cohorts of students who matriculated in the academic years
61999-2000 and 2000-2001.3 At that time, Bocconi oered 7 degree programs. However, only three
degree programs were large enough to require the splitting of lectures into more than one class:
Economics, Management, and Economics and Finance.4 The ocial duration of all programs was
4 years, and during the rst two years and most of the third, all students were required to take a
xed sequence of compulsory courses specic to their program. Students could then choose elective
courses within program-specic guidelines.
We exclude elective courses from our analysis for three reasons. First, elective courses typically
had only one class each year. Dierences in class size would therefore originate from dierential
enrollment across years, a source of variation that is plausibly correlated with student ability and
professor quality. If, for example, enrollment in a particular elective is high only when the professor is
highly eective, dierences in class size would be confounded with teacher quality. Second, because
students choose to take elective classes, the interpretation of estimates from these courses would
be complicated by issues of dierential selection into each class. Finally, while compulsory courses
were, in general, graded centrally by a group of graders rather than the instructor of a specic
class, the grading of elective courses was more decentralized and was conducted by the instructor
herself, sometimes with the aid of a grader. Centralized grading is important because when we
compare grades across classes, we can be sure that dierences in performance do not originate from
dierential grading practices on the part of an individual instructor.
The academic curricula of the three degree programs considered are described in Table A.1 in
the Appendix. The table reports the list of the compulsory courses for each of the three programs,
split by academic year and broad subject areas. The table also reports the number of teaching hours
for each course. There are usually 7-8 courses in each academic year, and each of them involves
on average approximately 60 hours of teaching/lecturing, although some courses are as long as 80
hours or as short as 32 hours.5
3We have access to data for many cohorts of students (starting with the enrolment year 1989) but, due to a series
of changes in the academic structure and to the unavailability of some crucial information, the cohorts considered here
are the only ones that could be used in this particular analysis.
4The other programs were Economics and Management of the Public Administration, Economics and Law, Law,
Economics and Management in Arts, and Culture and Communication. For students in these four programs, there
was only one class per cohort per program; variation in class size for these students originates only from dierences in
program or cohort size. Therefore, we exclude them from our analysis.
5The terms class and lecture often have dierent meanings in dierent countries and sometimes also in dierent
schools within the same country. In most British universities, for example, lecture indicates a teaching session where
7To summarize, the institutional setting and the data available for our exercise are ideally suited
to analyze the role of class size and composition on academic and labor market performance. First,
variation in both the size and the composition of the classes is randomly generated, as in a purposely
designed experiment. Second, rather than relying on a standardized test score that may only partly
proxy for the skills that school administrators value, we have an individual's performance in each
exam. Third, our data contains information on wages. Fourth, because we have administrative data,
we are able to observe the entire student population, not just a sample, and can therefore precisely
measure the amount of heterogeneity within a class. Fifth, our data contains a wealth of individual
level variables such as gender, family income, and the results of a cognitive admission test that are
all very precisely measured and used in the analysis to provide evidence on the random allocation
students and, more importantly, to analyze the role of class heterogeneity.
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics on selected variables for the students in our sample.
42 percent of the students are females and 22 percent have family incomes in the highest paying
fee bracket, above 90 thousands euros of gross yearly income (approximately 140,000 USD).6 On
average the GPA at this University is about 26/30, which would be about a B+ in the US grading
system.7 The gures in Table 1 also show some interesting dierences across the two cohorts that
we consider. The fraction of female students rises signicantly from 39 percent to 45 percent. At
the same time, the average entry test score (which is normalized within the 0-100 range) declines
from around 73 down to 56, the size of the cohort increases by almost 10 percent, and the average
grade increases by 2/3 of a grade point.
[TABLE 1]
an instructor - typically a full faculty member - presents the main material of the course. Classes are instead practical
sessions where a teacher assistant solves problem sets and applied exercises with the students. At Bocconi there was
no such distinction, meaning that the same randomly allocated groups were kept for both regular lectures and applied
classes. Hence, in the remainder of the paper we use the two terms interchangeably.
6Family income is recorded by the university for determining student fees. There are 6 income brackets but students
whose parental income falls into the highest income bracket are not required to submit any nancial statement and
their income is top coded.
7Grades at Bocconi, like in all other Italian universities, are given on a scale 0 to 30 with pass equal to 18.
82.1 Class allocation and measurement of class size
At the beginning of each academic year, students were randomly assigned a class identier: a
single digit number which identied the classes in which a student would sit. For the remainder
of the academic year, students were instructed to take lectures for all courses in the classroom(s)
associated with their identier. At the beginning of the next academic year, the allocation was
repeated. This procedure ensures that a student's peers and class sizes are randomly assigned and
vary across each academic year (De Giorgi et al. (2009) and De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009)).
Elective courses were usually much smaller in size and could easily be taught in a single class. To
avoid issues related to the endogenous choice of such courses, we exclude them from our analysis.
Although Bocconi's allocation mechanism is crucial for our analysis, the administration adopted
the randomization technique for reasons unrelated to our research. Courses were split into several
classes for the explicit purpose of keeping class sizes relatively small and to avoid clustering of
students in some classes. The yearly repetition of the random allocation was justied by the desire to
encourage interactions among all students. Moreover, for organizational reasons, students allocated
to a specic class were also taking most of their courses in exactly the same classroom. This is
an important feature of Bocconi's organization because it implies that variation in class size comes
mostly from variation in the physical size of the classrooms.
Bocconi is scattered around several buildings that have been built or refurbished at dierent
times so that not all classrooms have the same physical capacity. However, despite the dierences
in physical size, classrooms are very homogeneous in terms of both equipment and furniture, i.e. all
classrooms have PCs and overhead projectors and are furnished with essentially the same chairs,
benches and desks. Figure A1 in the Appendix shows pictures of a representative small, medium
and large classroom to conrm that, other than these dierences in size, all other physical features
of the rooms are very comparable.8
Both the 1999/2000 and the 2000/2001 cohorts of Management students (around 1,100) are
divided into 8 classes that range in size from 113 to 147, while both the 300 students in Economics
8The pictures were taken at the time of writing but similar furniture was available also during the time covered by
our data. The providers of boards, desks and benches, projectors and computers have not changed since then.
9and Finance and the roughly 150 students in the Economics degree program are split in two groups
each, with sizes ranging 138 to 158 and from 54 to 95, respectively.
Our main measure of class size comes from the student academic records, where the class identier
is reported next to each student's exam result. Thus, we can count the number of students in any
given cohort and year who have the same class identier. We call this variable the student count
and it corresponds to the number of students who eectively attended the lectures in the same
classroom.9
However, we know that this measure of class size diers somewhat from the number of students
who were originally given the same class identier. From the teaching planning oce we obtained
the exact number of students who were given the same class identier at the beginning of each
academic year. This is the number of students who were allocated to the same class by the university
administration at the beginning of each academic year. We call this variable the number of enrolled
students. In Table 2 we report the basic descriptive statistics of these measures of class size. Overall,
the student count varies between 54 and 158, with a mean size of about 130 and a standard deviation
of roughly 20 students. The number of enrolled students is generally slightly larger: it ranges from
a minimum of 64 to a maximum of 172, with an overall mean of 135 and a standard deviation of 28.
The within academic degree program variation in both measures of class size is more limited.
The mean (standard deviation) value of student count is 75 (16) in Economics. This compares to
an average class of 133 (6.5) in Management, and 149 (7) in Economics and Finance. When we
measure class size with the number of ocially enrolled students we nd slightly larger averages
and, consistently larger standard deviations as shown in Table 2. The degree of variation in the size
of the classes in our data is sometimes limited, especially if one looks within programs and academic
years, as we do in the regression analysis of section 4.
[TABLE 2 and FIGURE 1]
9Small variation may come from students taking the exam without attending the lectures or by informally switch-
ing across classes. Both these instances, however, are very limited. Attendance is always strongly encouraged and
(nominally) tightly enforced at Bocconi, especially for compulsory courses. Moreover, attendance levels are monitored
both during the academic year, by random visits of administrative attendants, and at the end of the course, with
the teaching evaluation questionnaires, that are regularly administered to the students. The data show very high
and stable attendance levels. Also, class switching is formally forbidden. Informally switching classes is theoretically
possible however, since students are given personalized calendars based on their class allocation, those who want to
do so would also have to reorganize their entire schedule.
10In Figure 1 we provide a more detailed comparison of our two measures of class size. The dark
and gray bars show the distributions of the student count and enrolled students variables, whereas
the dashed lines indicate the respective averages. We also plot the percentage dierence between
enrolled students and students counts (the little x's) in relation to the number of students originally
assigned to that class identier (on the horizontal axis). Such dierences are close to zero (on
average about 6 percent),10 and they appear to be unrelated to the original ocial size of the class.
We also check this relationship by running a simple regression of the percentage dierence between
our two measures on the number of ocially enrolled students. The estimated coecient is 0.0006
(with a standard error of 0.0004). In a few cases, however, the dierences are larger than 15 percent
(namely in 15 classes out of 72).
Dierences between the student count and the number of enrolled students come from students
requesting changes to their original class allocation later on in the year, either for the entire year
or for some specic courses. Such requests were (and still are) usually rare and needed to be well
motivated. One common reason for such changes are health problems that might prevent a student
from accessing some parts of the building (e.g. because of a broken leg) where the class is located.
Overall, in our data less than 6 percent of the students ever switch a class, either for a single
course or for an entire academic year. Switches are approximately ve times more likely to occur
in the rst academic year than later years, also girls are 30 percent less likely to switch. Moreover,
high ability students are more likely to switch. Although these changes are rare and could not be
explicitly requested, by the student, for academic reasons, we cannot rule out a priori that some
of them were implicitly driven by factors, like teacher quality or class size, that are endogenous to
our process of interest (academic achievement or labor market performance). It should however be
noticed that in the data the probability of switching is not signicantly aected by the size of the
class, in a probit for the probability of switching the coecient attached to the ocial class size
(our enrolled variable) is very small and insignicant (.0002 with standard error .0002). However,
as mentioned above, students with dierent characteristics may be more or less prone to advance
10Note that the enrolled students variable tends to be larger than the student count variable because a small fraction
(5.7%) of students were enrolled in the class but do not have valid entries in the student database. These individuals
include students from dierent cohorts who are retaking a class or who delayed taking a course by 1 or more years
and students from dierent degree programs who switched programs.
11such requests, raising the possibility that student count is endogenous.
For these reasons, in the empirical application we present results using both OLS and an IV
procedure, where we instrument eective class size measured by the student count with the number
of ocially enrolled students, which, being the outcome of the random allocation algorithm, is purely
exogenous. Moreover, the reduced form estimates of our empirical model also have an interesting
interpretation. These estimates are the eect of changing the policy variable that the university
administration can more easily manipulate: the number of ocially enrolled students. In Section 3
we further discuss our empirical strategy.
Table 3 summarizes the extent of heterogeneity in the classroom and across the 72 dierent
classes.11 There is a non-negligible variation in one's peer group composition although, as we will
show, the amount of heterogeneity is consistent with random assignment of students into classes.
For example, the share of females is on average equal to 0.4 with a between-class standard deviation
of 0.08. At the extremes, class 11 in the third year of the Finance degree program, for the 2001
cohort, has a share of 0.23; while class 4 of the rst year Business, 2000 cohort has a share of 0.6.
Similarly, the share of high income students is on average of 0.23, with a range of variation 0.12-0.35.
We also detect considerable variation within a degree program for each cohort.
[TABLE 3]
In the next subsection we provide evidence of the eectiveness of the random allocation mecha-
nism of students as well as some evidence of the essentially random allocation of teachers to classes.
2.2 Evidence of random allocation
In this section, we provide evidence that both students and teachers are randomly assigned to
classes, as in De Giorgi and Pellizzari (2009) and De Giorgi et al. (2009), and as in Guryan et al.
(2009). To establish that, conditional on a cohort, degree program, and academic year, students are
not dierentially selecting certain classes, we marshal three pieces of evidence.
11Students in the degree program in Management (around 1,100) are divided into 8 classes, while the students in
both Economics and Economics and Finance are split in two groups each. Additionally, classes change in each of the 3
academic years and 2 cohorts, hence the total number of classes that we observe is (832)+(232)+(232) = 72.
12First, we demonstrate that the distribution of students' entry test scores is consistent with
random assignment. The upper panel of Figure 2 compares these distributions of entry test scores
of students in the 8 classes of the Management program in each academic year. The middle and
lower panels of Figure 2 plot the same distributions for the 2 classes of Economics and Economics
and Finance, respectively.12
[FIGURE 2]
As it is evident from these graphs, the distributions of test scores are very similar. Table A2
in the Appendix conrms that this visual evidence is consistent with random assignment. In this
table, we report the p-values of a complete battery of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for the equality of
the distribution of ability in all possible pairs of classes within the same degree program, cohort and
academic year. Only in 7 out of the 180 admissible pairs of classes (i.e. 4 percent of the cases) are
the distributions statistically distinguishable at the 95 percent level.
Our second piece of evidence of the random assignment of students is presented in Table 4 (Panel
A), where we check for random assignment on other observable characteristics. Here, we report tests
for the equality of the mean percentage of female, the mean percentage of students from top income
families and the mean entry test score across classes within each cohort-degree program-academic
year cell.13 In none of the cases is it possible to detect dierences that are signicant at conventional
statistical signicance levels.
Finally, we demonstrate that class size is uncorrelated with the observable characteristics of
students in the class. Ruling out this relationship is important because if higher ability students
were assigned to smaller classes, results showing a systematic relationship between class size and
subsequent performance could reect underlying dierences between the students. In Panel B of
Table 4, we run a series of regressions where the unit of observation is a single class (i.e. with
72 observations in total). These regressions help determine whether either of our two measures of
class size (the student count and the number of ocially enrolled students) is correlated with a
12For expositional brevity, all the distributions refer to only one cohort (2000), although the results are similar if
we use the other cohort.
13The reported F-tests are derived from regressions of the mean characteristics of the class on dummies for the class
identiers, controlling for cohort and academic year xed eects. The regressions are run using class-level observation,
i.e. 48 observation for Management and 12 each for Economics and Economics and Finance.
13classes' share of females, share of students from high income families, or average test scores. All
results condition on the full three-way interaction of cohort, degree program, and academic year
xed eects. Results show that class size is never signicantly correlated with any of the observable
characteristics of the student body that we consider. In addition, the reported coecients are very
small in magnitude.
[TABLE 4]
We now turn to studying the assignment of teachers to classes. One potential concern is that
teachers select the size of the class they want to teach. If, for example the best teachers are allocated
to teach smaller classes, our estimates would reect both the direct eect of class size and the indirect
eect of teacher quality.
We have several reasons to believe that this concern does not apply to our data. First, in personal
conversations with university administrators, they have indicated that the assignment of teachers
was completely unrelated to the process of allocating students to classes. In fact, the two processes
were carried out by distinct bodies: secretaries in each department would assign teachers to class
identiers and ocers in a centralized teaching planning oce allocated students to class identiers.
Second, the available empirical evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that a teacher's identity
is uncorrelated with the size of her class. Although for privacy reasons we lack the information to
identify individual teachers, we demonstrate that teachers who are assigned to teach small classes
during one year are not more likely to teach small classes in subsequent years. In particular, we were
able to reconstruct the identiers of the teachers of 4 courses in the Management program. Figure
3 shows the size of the classes allocated to these teachers over the academic years 1999-2000 and
2000-2001. On the horizontal axis we report the (anonymized) teacher identier and the vertical bar
indicating the size of each of the classes taught by that teacher in those academic years. The graphical
evidence strongly is consistent with random assignment; for example, instructors of relatively small
classes in the 1999-2000 school year appear to have average sized classes during the 2000-2001 school
year. In Panel B of Figure 3, we show the same data for the following 4 academic years, 2001-2002 to
2004-2005, thus increasing the number of observations. While the structure of the degree programs
14changed for cohorts entering after 2000, we believe that the assignment of teachers to classes was
similar in the 2001-2002 to 2004-2005 cohorts. Evidence from these later years is therefore helpful
for understanding the assignment of teachers. In those later years, the within-teacher standard
deviation in the size of the assigned class is larger than the between-teachers variation and, indeed,
quite close to the overall variation. To reiterate, a teacher could be assigned 121 students (about
the average) in 2001-02 and then 160 students the following year (the second largest class).14
Finally, we supplement this graphical evidence with a simple statistical test for random assign-
ment of teachers. A regression, omitted for brevity, of enrollment on teacher xed eects shows
that certain teachers are not systematically assigned to small or large classes. Out of the 53 teacher
xed eects that we can identify with our data (we use the same data of Panel A in Figure 3 for
the regression) only 8 of them were signicant at the 90 percent level and 4 of them were signicant
at the 95 percent level. The F-test for the joint signicance of the full set of teacher xed eects
never rejects the hypothesis that they are jointly equal to zero. These results are very robust to the
inclusion of additional dummies for academic year and degree program.
[FIGURE 3]
2.3 Survey of graduates
In addition to administrative records, Bocconi regularly surveys its graduates through a ques-
tionnaire administered to every student about one and a half years after graduation (De Giorgi et al.
2009). These surveys focus on the labor market experience of the graduates and contain information
on the employment proles, wages, and job satisfaction.
While we view the ability to link detailed information about students while in school with labor
market outcomes as an important contribution of our paper, we recognize there are two potential
problems with these surveys. First, the response rates are not particularly high; overall, we are able
to match slightly more than 50 percent of the students in our cohorts (not unusual for survey data).
However, there is no relation between non-response and class size, i.e. we did not nd any signicant
14In the main analysis we do not pool data for the academic years 1999-2001 and 2001-2004 because, starting with
2001-2002, the entire structure of the degree programs was changed.
15correlation between non-responses and our class size measures (student count or enrolled).
These response rates are mostly due to the compulsory military service for men, which males
typically completed after graduation. On average only about 34 percent of them answer the survey,
as opposed to almost 73 percent of females. While we are concerned that selection into the survey
may bias our results, we can partially alleviate these concerns by comparing results between our
two cohorts. Military service was 10 months long and was abolished in 2001 for all citizens born
after 1985. Although the students in our cohorts were born before 1985, in the years prior to the
abolition of the service, the set of reasons that allowed exemption were gradually expanded.15 Hence,
the number of people required to serve declines substantially between our two cohorts. While the
response rates for females was similar across the two cohorts, the response rate for males increased
from 24 percent to 47 percent. If dierential response rates were driving our results, we would expect
that the results would look dierent across the two survey years. Instead, we nd that the results
are generally consistent.
A second issue relates to the measure of wages, which are recorded in 11 intervals. The large
majority of respondents (over 90 percent) do report wage information, which is asked to anyone
who has had a job between the day of her graduation and the day of the interview (96 percent
of the respondents). The intervals range from below 750 to over 5,000 euros per month (net of
taxes) and are spaced by either 250 or 500 euros. The descriptive statistics (means and standard
deviations) reported in Table 1 refer to an imputed measure of wages computed at the mid-point of
the interval indicated by the respondent.16 All monetary values are in euros at current prices. The
mean entry wage is around 1,300 euros net per month, approximately 1,700-1,800 USD. The mean
wage increases over time at a rate (around 9 percent) higher than ination.
3 Empirical Strategy
With a few important exceptions (Krueger (1999), Krueger and Whitmore (2001), Duo et al.
(2008 and 2009)), the existing literature on class size and class heterogeneity has mostly exploited
15For example, around the year 2000 a set of new rules allowed permanent exemption from the service to students
who enrolled in a PhD programme (one of the author benetted from it).
16For the lowest and the highest intervals we take the upper and the lower limit, respectively.
16natural experiments as source of identication. In this work, we exploit the experimental variation
arising from the random allocation of students to classes followed at Bocconi University. This
random allocation produces exogenous variation in the size and composition of classes and allows
us to cleanly identify the eect of class size and heterogeneity on academic performance and labor
market outcomes.
Variation in the size of the class is generated by dierences in the physical capacities of the
classrooms across the university buildings and can be considered exogenous to other inputs in the
education production function. In particular, all classrooms have exactly the same equipment and
the same furniture except that larger classrooms have larger blackboards and screens.
In the next section, we explore the eect of class size and class heterogeneity on both academic
performance and labor market outcomes. Here we briey discuss our empirical strategies for the
identication of these two eects.
Let us start with academic performance. To avoid complications due to the endogenous choice of
elective courses, we concentrate exclusively on compulsory courses that comprise the vast majority
of a student's courses during the rst three academic years. For the two cohorts used in this
analysis, students are randomly allocated to dierent classes three times, one at the beginning of
each academic year. Hence, in our empirical specication we use the average grade in the courses
of each academic year as a measure of student performance, and we regress it on the class size in
each year. We have three observations for each student (one per year), which allow us to control for
individual eects as well as for year and program eects. Notice that because the average grade per
academic year is computed over a slightly dierent number of courses across degree programs and
academic years, we weight observations accordingly.17
We derive our empirical specication from the following model:
yijtcd =  sizejtcd + i + tcd + uijtcd (1)
17Each student-year observation is weighted by the number of exams taken by the student in that specic academic
year. Table A1 in the Appendix shows that there is some small variation in such number across degree programs and
years.
17where yijtcd is the average grade of student i in class j, year t, cohort c and degree program d,
sizejtcd is the size of the class j in the same tcd cell, i is an individual student xed eect, tcd is
a xed eect that varies by year-cohort-program cells and uijtcd is a residual random term.
The parameters of equation 1 cannot be identied through simple OLS if students defy the
random assignment and change classes in a way that is correlated with teacher quality or class size.
To describe the nature of the potential endogeneity of sizejtct, assume that the random term uijtcd is
the sum of an unobservable class component jtcd that is common to all students who are allocated
to class j in the tcd cell and a purely random idiosyncratic term vijtcd:
uijtcd = jtcd + vijtcd (2)
The most obvious interpretation of jtcd is teacher quality, but it could represent any class specic
unobservable shock.
Then, the student count sizejtcd results from the aggregation of the individual re-allocation
decisions of all the students in the same cohort and degree program. Students who were originally
allocated to class j may decide to switch class, while others who were originally allocated elsewhere
may request to be moved to class j:







where enrolljtcd is the number of students originally allocated by the administration to class j in
the tcd cell, inij is an indicator function that is equal to 1 if student i (who was originally allocated
to a class dierent from j) moves to class j and outij is an indicator function that takes value 1 if
student i (originally allocated to class j) manages to be moved elsewhere.
The key endogeneity concern arises because the functions inij and outij might be inuenced by
jtcd, i.e. teacher quality in class j (or any other class-specic shock). More formally, we can dene
18the two functions as follows:
inij = f (Xijtcd;ijtcd) (4)
outij = g (Xijtcd;ijtcd) (5)
where Xijtcd is a set of observable characteristics of the ij pair in the tcd cell and ijtcd can be
interpreted either as a single unobservable shock or as a vector of unobservable characteristics of
the ij in the same tcd cell.
In this setting, applying simple OLS to equation 1 does not produce consistent estimates of the
parameters, particularly of . The OLS orthogonality assumption fails because E(sizejtcd  uijtcd) 6=
0. In fact, as equations 3, 4 and 5 demonstrate, the unobservable class shock jtcd is both a
determinant of sizejtcd and a component of the error term uijtcd of equation 1.
This discussion also claries that enrolljtcd is a perfect instrument for sizejtcd in equation 1. In
fact, while the observed class size may be correlated with the error term, E(sizejtcd  uijtcd) 6= 0,
enrolljtcd is merely the outcome of the random allocation algorithm. Hence it is exogenous by
construction and E(enrolljtcd  uijtcd) = 0. At the same time, equation 3 claries that enrolljtcd and
sizejtcd are correlated. Theoretically, if the process of reallocation of students across classes was
substantial, enrolljtcd could be a weak instrument. Given what we know from discussions with the
university administrators and from our analysis of the raw data in Section 2.1, we do not expect this
to be a serious concern. In fact, the results of the rst stage regressions for all the specications that
we present in Section 4 conrm this expectation (the F-tests of the excluded instruments range from
51 to 7,000.) Our solution to this identication problem resembles closely the approach of Krueger
(1999).
Like all IV empirical strategies in which there are no \deers", our estimates recover the average
treatment eect that is local to the population who \complies" with the instrument (Imbens and
Angrist, 1994). In this application, we think that the local average treatment eect (LATE) is likely
to be interesting for at least two reasons. First, because switching is rare, a large fraction of the
students are likely to comply with their random assignment, and the LATE may be similar to the
19average treatment eect. Second, the LATE is policy relevant because it recovers the eect of class
size for students who comply with the university's assignment.
Although we use enrolled students primarily as an instrument for student count, the reduced form
estimates are interesting in their own right, as they may be interpreted as the relevant policy eect
from the perspective of a university administrator. In fact, while changing the number of ocially
enrolled students (enrolled students) is a relatively easy task, the enforcement and manipulation
of the actual (size) student count would depend on the university's enforcement capabilities, which
might vary across colleges. At a minimum, the reduced form estimates are of interest to Bocconi's
administrators.
Regardless of how we measure class size (student count or enrolled students) or the estimation
procedure used (OLS, IV, or reduced form), the computation of the standard errors of the estimated
coecients from equation 1 for correct inference poses some additional problems. First, the individ-
ual xed eect i induces correlation across the observations that refer to the same student. Second,
we also need to cluster the standard errors to take account of the fact that students in the same
class-year-cohort-program cell share the same class size sizeijtcd.
We address the rst problem by transforming the model in orthogonal deviations, a transfor-
mation that eliminates the individual eect i from the equation and, in a standard setting, also
preserves homoskedasticity. Specically, orthogonal deviations are computed as the dierence be-
tween the individual observation and the mean of all future observations for the same individual,
adjusted by a constant factor to ensure that all cross-sectional observations share the same vari-
ance within-group, see Arellano (2003). Like rst dierencing or the within-group transformation
(the transformation used by most econometric software packages, like Stata, to produce xed-eect
estimators), also orthogonal deviations eliminate the individual unobservable xed term from the
model (i in our equation 1). Moreover, in a standard setting, transforming the model in rst
dierences, within-group deviations or orthogonal deviations is equivalent in terms of asympthotic
results. Nevertheless, in order to obtain the most ecient estimates, it is necessary to apply GLS to
the rst dierence or within-group models while simple OLS is sucient with orthogonal deviations.
20As a consequence, orthogonal deviations allow to deal more exibly with other complications in the
covariance structure of the error terms, like clustering.
In fact, in the specic case of equation 1, homoskedasticity is not guaranteed in the transformed
model because class size does not vary at the same level of the dependent variable. While academic
performance varies at the level of the single student and across academic years, class size is constant
for all students who are allocated the same identier within the same year-cohort-program group.
Hence, we cluster the standard errors of the transformed model at the correct level of the class-
year-cohort-program cell (there are 72 such cells in total). Applying such a clustering with an
alternative xed-eect transformation, like rst dierences of within-group deviations, would be
more complicated as one would have to simultaneously account for correlation in the error terms
induced by the panel structure of the data as well as for the clusters.
In Section 4, we investigate the eect of class size on academic performance using a series of
variants of equation 1: we look at heterogeneity of the eect of class size across dierent types of
students, and we consider the eect of class composition on academic performance, in this latter
case measures of class heterogeneity are added to 1. In all cases, the empirical strategy for the
estimation of equation 1 and its variants remains the same.
When we investigate the eect of class heterogeneity, we construct the instruments for the actual
class composition using information from the university administration about the original ocial
class allocation of each single student and we construct the corresponding measures of heterogeneity
(e.g. share of females) among students who were ocially allocated to the same class.
In Section 5 we look at the eect of class size and class composition on labor market performance.
In this case the choice of the empirical model is less obvious. While we observe only one outcome
for each student (her wage after entering the labor market), we observe at least three dierent class
sizes for each student in compulsory courses over her academic career. We choose the most obvious
specication, where we include the average class size (size) a student has been exposed to according
to the following equation:
wicd =  sizeicd + Xicd + icd (6)
21where wicd is the wage reported by student i in cohort c and degree program d, size is the average
of the 3 class sizes a student has experienced in her rst three academic years and Xicd is a large set
of controls determined prior to a student's matriculation. These controls include gender, the score
obtained in the cognitive entry test, household income, geographical residence, type of high school,
plus survey wave, cohort and degree program xed eects.
Similarly to equation 1, identication rests on the random allocation mechanism and we address
the potential endogeneity with the same approach discussed above. The standard errors are clustered
at the same level of variation of sizeicd, i.e. the intersection of cohort, degree program and the three
class identiers of each academic year.18
4 The eect of class size and class composition on academic per-
formance
We estimate equation 1 both by OLS and IV, to account for the possible endogeneity in the class
size measure as given by the student count. Later (Section 4.1) we investigate the interaction of
class size with the individual characteristics of the student, to test whether some type of individuals
benets or suers more from smaller classes. Finally, in Section 4.2 we estimate the direct eect of
class composition on academic performance.
Table 5 reports our main results for academic performance. Using a simple linear specication
(columns 1 to 4) we nd a signicant eect of class size on academic performance.19 The OLS
estimate in column 2 indicates that one additional student in the class reduces the individual mean
grade in the corresponding academic year by 0.01 grade points over an average of 26 (B+ for US
universities) and a standard deviation of 2.33. Since our estimates are often signicant at the margin
of the 95 percent level, we report both the standard errors and the p-values (in square parentheses).
For example, the OLS estimate in column 2 is signicant at the 93.1 percent level.
18Because averaging over three years of data reduces the amount of variation in course heterogeneity, we have not
enough variation to directly identify the eects of heterogeneity on wages.
19The specication in column 1 of Table 5 does not include student's xed eects, while column 2 does include these
xed eects. If class size were randomly assigned to students, adding a student xed eect should result in an estimate
of similar magnitude but smaller standard errors. Consistent with this hypothesis, the estimates in columns 1 and 2
are similar in magnitude, but that the standard error is substantially smaller in column 2 than in column 1.
22The IV estimate is a bit larger in magnitude and equal to -0.017, although it is not statistically
dierent from the OLS. As we expected, the F-test of the rst stage is very strong (F-stat of 242)
and it allows to rule out the usual concerns due to weak instruments. Finally, the reduced form
estimate is between the OLS and IV. Both the IV and the RF estimates are signicant at the 94
percent level.
To put the magnitude of the estimated eects into a better perspective, take the IV coecient
and consider the eect of increasing class size by one standard deviation (computed over the entire
sample). This corresponds to approximately 20 students or about 15 percent over an average class
size of around 131. Such a change would reduce the mean grade by about 0.34 points or about 0.15
of a standard deviation, an eect that is consistent with the existing literature that nds signicant
eects (see Angrist and Lavy (1999), Krueger (1999), Bandiera et al. (2008), Pinto Machado and
Vera-Hernandez (2009)).
Looking at the heterogeneity of the eects by major, we get a substantial eect for the Economics
major, point estimate -.027 signicant at the 99 percent level which translates into a reduction of .46
points for standard deviation increase in the class size (17 students) or a 20 percent of a standard
deviation decrease in the average grade. For the Management major we get a point estimate of
-.014 with standard error of .009, in terms of the eect we have that a standard deviation increase
in the class size (7 students) reduces the average grade by .1 or 4 percent of a standard deviation.
The results for the Economics and Finance major are larger in terms of point estimate, .1 points
reduction in the GPA (signicant at the 99 percent level), which translates into a fall of 30 percent
of a standard deviation for a standard deviation increase in the class size (7 students).20
[TABLE 5]
In addition, we also attempted to determine if the relationship between class size and student
performance is non-linear. In a setting where class size is one of the inputs of a standard human
capital production function with decreasing return to scale, we would nd that the impact of class
20To keep the discussion concise, we focus on the results from the pooled regressions (across degree programs).
Although the heterogeneity of the eects is quite interesting, we believe it to be beyond the scope of the current paper.
The estimation results by degree program are available from the authors.
23size attens out at larger sizes. To determine if this model is consistent with our data, we ran two
types of specications. First, we estimated spline regressions where we allow the eect of class size
to vary at each quartile of the distribution. Next, we included class size and its square as regressors.
For each model, we estimated the OLS, IV, and reduced form specications. In none of these
specications is it possible to reject the null that the relationship between class size and student
performance is linear. The lack of evidence of non-linearities suggests that a possible mechanism
for explaining the class size negative eects even in large classes is that suggested by Lazear (2001),
where students are subject to disruption shocks that aect one single student and then propagate by
disturbing the entire class (or students in a neighborhood of who is rst aected). In that setting,
the class size eect is indeed negative even for large classes if the probability of no-disruption is
large, as one would expect among college students.21 Essentially in the Lazear's model classroom
teaching is a typical public good subject to the negative externalities produced by the students
asking (meaningless) questions or simply chatting.
To conclude this section, we present some simple evidence to show that students themselves have
the perception that larger classes are detrimental to their learning. As is now customary in most
universities, Bocconi regularly administers evaluation questionnaires to its students for gathering
their opinions about various aspects of the teaching environment. In particular, Bocconi students
are asked to indicate on a scale from 1 (disagree) to 5 (agree) if they agree with the following
statement: "the number of students in the classroom allows all the teaching activities to be regularly
and eciently carried out." In Figure 4 we plot the average answer to this question in each of the 72
class-year-program-cohort cell against the corresponding class size measured either by the students
count (upper panel) or by the number of ocially enrolled students (lower panel).
As the gures clearly show, the two variables are negatively (and signicantly at the 95 and 89
percent levels, respectively) correlated, for example a standard deviation increase in the Students
count variable results into a .1 points fall in that measure over a mean of 3.8. Notice that the
R-squared of these simple regressions are however relatively small (9.3 percent when the students
21Borrowing from Lazear (2001), if the probability that a student is not disrupting her or others' learning is p then
the probability that disruption takes place in a classroom of n students is 1   p
n, which behaves essentially linearly
when p ! 1 even when the class-size is between 1 and 200 students.




After having established that class size reduces student achievement, we now explore the hetero-
geneity of the eect across students of dierent ability (as measured by the pre-enrollment admission
test), gender, and family income. These results are interesting for at least two reasons. First, study-
ing the heterogeneity of the eect is informative of the distributional consequences of lowering class
size. If, for example, students from poorer families beneted more than others, reducing class size
could be an ecient means of redistribution. Second, if school administrators face a budget con-
straint and cannot provide small classes for all students, they may want to allocate spots in small
classes to students who are likely to benet the most.
Table 6 reports the results obtained by augmenting our basic specication (columns 1 to 3 of
Table 5) with interactions of class size and three crucial characteristics of the students: ability,
gender, and income. The OLS estimates are never signicant, while in both the IV and the reduced
form estimation we nd that the negative eect of larger classes essentially disappears for female
and students from wealthier families.
[TABLE 6]
One possible explanation for the above results is that students from wealthier families can access
remedial tools for less eective lectures (such as better textbooks, better study environment, remedial
private teachers). Given that females have more pro-social behavior in general (they drink less (Sloan
et al., 1995), they smoke less (Gruber, 2001), they commit less crime (Ludwig, 2001)), they may also
be less disruptive in the class. If there is some degree of clustering of study mates by gender, women
may suer less from disruption because they sit close and interact more with other girls than with
boys, who disrupt more.22 This interpretation would also be consistent with the results that we
22The literature also documents that women are more risk averse (Schubert et al., 1999) and "shy-away" from
competition (Gneezy et al. (2003)).
25obtain in the next section on class composition. A puzzling result is that the OLS estimates appear
to be all insignicant while the IV results on class size are similar to the earlier ones, although with
larger standard errors.
4.2 Class Heterogeneity
In this section we explore how the heterogeneity of a student's peers inuences her academic
performance. This exercise is interesting for at least two reasons. First, growing evidence suggests
that the composition of one's peer group is an important determinant of individual behavior and
of students' achievement.23 Further, recent evidence in Duo et al. (2008) shows that tracking has
positive eects on students' performance; in the same spirit Pinto-Machado and Vera-Hernandez
(2009) nd positive and heterogeneous eects of peers' ability on student performance. Cooley
(2009) nds evidence of peer eects on performance within race-based reference groups.
Here, we investigate whether the composition of classmates in terms ability, income, and gender
aects student performance. We compute a measure of dispersion for ability, income, and gender
for each class. Because of the process of repeated random allocation that we described earlier
(Section 2.1), each student is exposed to a dierent set of randomly selected peers in each academic
year. For each of these groups, we compute the fraction of female in the class, the fraction of
students from high income families and the mean and the standard deviation of the (log) entry test
score for those eectively in the classroom (similarly to the student count denition).24 Further,
having obtained from the administration the original class identier assigned to each student by the
random allocation mechanism, we can produce the same measures of class heterogeneity based on
this purely exogenous and theoretical class composition (similarly to what we do for the enrolled
students measure). Hence, in Table 7 we report both the OLS, IV, and reduced form estimates.
[TABLE 7]
In columns 1 to 3, we concentrate on a simple linear specication, and we nd that a larger share
23See the large literature on social interactions and peer eects summarized by Jackson (2008).
24Notice that the mean proportion of females and high income students are sucient statistics for the distribution
of these dichotomous variables within each class. The entry test score, instead, is a continuous variable therefore we
compute both the mean and the standard deviation.
26of female students in the class is benecial for academic achievement: increasing the percentage of
females in an average class (which is approximately 40 percent female) by 10 percentage points
increases GPA of the average student by 0.14-0.15 of a grade points or 0.05-0.06 of a standard
deviation. Increasing the fraction of high-income students has the opposite eect: adding 10 students
of this type to an average class (which has approximately 28 out of 130 students) reduces the GPA
of the average classmate by 0.16 grade points or 0.07 of a standard deviation, although this eect
disappears in both the IV and the reduced form specications.
In the following columns 4 to 6 of Table 7 we experiment with a simple quadratic specication
to determine if the eect of class composition is linear. In the OLS results, both the linear and the
quadratic eect of the dispersion in ability (measured by the standard deviation of the log entry
test score) are signicant, suggesting that more diverse classes perform better but that such eect is
decreasing. The results for gender composition are qualitatively similar; for classes with the average
share of female students, an increase in the fraction of female students increases performance, but the
marginal eect declines (and eventually becomes negative) as the share of female students increases.
Finally, the incidence of high income students still has no impact on performance. In columns 5 and
6, we replicate the estimates using our IV and reduced form specications. Here, only the eects
of gender composition remain signicantly dierent form zero, although the sign and magnitude of
the test score results are broadly similar across specications.
Our results for gender composition highlight the importance of estimating non-linear eects. The
results from the linear specication, columns (1)-(3), suggest that for our sample, increasing the share
of female students increases performance. Because the students in our sample are predominately
(58 percent) male, these results are consistent with at least two dierent hypotheses: (a) students
always learn better when the share of female students increases (b) students tend to learn best when
the ratio of males and females is approximately even. Our quadratic results cast doubt on (a).
Taken at face value, these coecients suggest that the optimal gender composition is 49.4 percent
female.25
25The baseline results suggest that the eect of share female are given by: 5:836  (share female)   5:895 
(share female)
2. This function is maximized when 5:836 = 2  5:895  (share female) or when share female = :494.
27To give a sense of the magnitude of these non-linear estimates, Figure 5 plots the marginal eects
of our three measures of class composition (dispersion in ability, gender composition and income
composition) derived from both the linear (corresponding to the estimates in columns 1 to 3 of Table
7) and the quadratic (corresponding to the estimates in columns 4 to 6 of Table 7) specications.
In the left panels of Figure 6 we show the OLS results while the IVs are plotted in the right panels.
[FIGURE 5]
The OLS quadratic eect of the dispersion in test scores (top left panel) shows that increasing
the diversity in ability among classmates by one standard deviation (approximately 0.015) from the
mean increases performance by 0.56 of a grade point or 1/4 of a standard deviation. Performing the
same exercise, i.e. increasing test dispersion by one standard deviation, starting from an already
diversied class, say one with dispersion in ability that is 2 standard deviations above the mean
(corresponding approximately to the top 5 percent of the distribution), increases performance by
0.48 of a grade point, that is about 15 percent less than before. The entire eect of test score
dispersion, however, disappears under the IV specication due to large standard errors.
Our results clearly show that gender composition has a robust and large eect on performance.
The point estimates on the share of females remain signicant in all specications: OLS and IV,
linear and quadratic. The marginal eects are plotted in the middle panels of Figure 6. Let us
focus on the IV specication (although the OLS estimates are not substantially dierent, and using
a Hausman test, we cannot reject the null of equality between the OLS and IV) and notice that
increasing the percentage of female classmates by one standard deviation (approximately 0.04) from
the mean (which is equal to about 40 percent) increases performance by 0.23 of a grade point or
10 percent of a standard deviation. Performing the same exercise, i.e. increasing the incidence of
females by one standard deviation, starting from a class that is already female dominated, say one
with female incidence that is 2 standard deviations above the mean (corresponding approximately
to the top 5 percent of the distribution), increases performance by 0.19 of a grade point, that is
about 17 percent less than before.
The results for income dispersion are signicant only in the linear OLS specication and indicate
28that a larger share of high income classmates reduces performance. However, such eect disappears
in all other specications.
The positive eect of the incidence of female students in the class seems consistent with the
idea that girls have a more pro-social behavior and, are less disruptive. Along the same lines, the
negative eect of wealthier students may be rationalized by arguing that, given their ability to make
up for less productive lectures with private resources, they may be more prone to disruption to the
detriment of the entire class. The positive eect of dispersion in ability indicates that students'
skills are complements in the classroom production function.
The non-linearities in some of these eects open up the possibility reshuing students in class-
rooms and increasing average performance without necessarily requiring additional resources. We
return to the issue of optimal class formation in Section 6.
5 The eect of class size on labor market performance
In this section we test whether the negative eect of class size on academic performance aects
labor market outcomes around 18 months after graduation. The literature on school resources
and labor market performance (Mot, 1996; Hanushek, 2006) nds a substantial positive eect of
school resources, measured as class size or teacher per pupil ratios. As explained in Section 2.3,
we observe our students once they graduate, typically around one and a half years after graduation
and, although we have no longer term outcomes, we believe it is important to study the short-run
impacts (Oyer, 2006).
Given that our students are assigned to a dierent class in each of the 3 years of required courses,
the most natural way to specify our empirical model is to consider the average of those 3 class sizes
as our measure of treatment. The results are reported in Table 8, where we produce estimates of
equation 6 using a variety of specications. In columns 1 and 2 we adapt the estimation procedure to
the original wage information (recorded in intervals), and we apply interval regression. To avoid the
technicalities involved in adopting an IV procedure in this model, we report only results computed
using either the students count or the enrolled students as a measure of class size. In the following
29columns (3 to 5), we use as a dependent variable a continuous version of the wage information
computed at the mid points of the intervals indicated by each respondent. Then, we can apply the
standard techniques and we report OLS, IV and reduced form estimates.
The estimates reported in the rst 5 columns of Table 8 indicate that the eect of the average
class size in college on entry wages is negative and of non-trivial magnitude across all specications,
although the eect is not always precisely estimated.
[TABLE 8]
The magnitude of the coecients suggests that an increase of 20 students in the size of the av-
erage class would reduce monthly wages by approximately 80 to 85 euros on average or around 115
USD or 6 percent over the average monthly wage. This is a substantial eect, particularly if such
a penalty is never recovered over the course of one's working life, as suggested by Oyer (2006). In
the last 5 columns of Table 8 we repeat all the estimates by conditioning on academic performance.
Interestingly, across specications, the magnitude of the eects decreases by approximately 10 per-
cent, suggesting that class size aects labor market outcomes both through its impact on academic
performance and also independently through some other mechanism, possibly the development of
non academic skills.26
6 The optimal class allocation
A crucial policy question is whether an optimal class can be designed by the administrators in
terms of size and composition.27 We address this question given the estimated parameters from
Section 4.
First, we must take a stand on the planner's objective function and on the constraints she
faces. For simplicity, we assume that the planner seeks to maximize the sum of individual expected
26This result is robust to controlling exibly for the graduation mark, e.g. quintiles of the graduation mark.
27One has to bear in mind the caveats highlighted by Carrell et al. (2009b) who performed an experiment on class
composition by constructing classes that were \optimal" according to the experimental estimates of exogenous peer
eects from Carrell et al. (2009a). Carrell et al. (2009b) found that instead of improving students performance there
actually was a fall in it. The authors explain the surprising result with changes in the interaction process induced
by the extreme sorting applied. Our analysis instead predicts \optimal" composition that are well within the sample
variation and clearly do not support extreme sorting of students.
30performances, although we recognize that there are many other reasonable objective functions, i.e.
maximum performance, dispersion of the distribution or other objectives.
We further assume that the total number of classrooms and teachers, the size of each classroom,
and the student population are xed. This assumption corresponds to solving the short run problem
where resources are supplied inelastically. If we solved the problem under several dierent scenarios,
these results would also help the social planner optimally allocate resources to higher education.
Here, the planner will change the type of students in each classroom, keeping the number of classes
and professors xed.
We write student i0s expected performance in class j as follows:
Pij = sizej + 1femalej + 2female2



























where wj is the size of class j.





























where  is the appropriate cdf.
31A simple example will help clarify how our estimates can inform the allocation of students
into classes based on gender. Assume that the administrators have three classrooms of xed size.
Let these sizes be given by N1;N2; and (N   N1   N2), respectively. To simplify the analysis so
that it focuses specically on the gender margin, assume further that ability does not inuence
performance (1 = 2 = 0) , or that the ability of males and females is drawn from an identical
distribution and that the planner does not know the ability of the individual student. Because the
size of the classroom j is xed at Nj, we can re-write the problem as solving for the share of females
in each classroom (fj =
Fj
Nj). This transformation ensures that our results are directly comparable
to our empirical section. We need to dene only J   1 classrooms as the Jth one would be just the
complement to the others. Let's also dene f = F
N as the fraction of females in the population of
interest.
The solutions to this problem are:
f
1 =
22n1F   1N (1   n1(3   2n1   2n2)   2n2(1   n2))




22n2F   1N (1   n1(2   2n1   3n2)   2n2(1   n2))







1   n1   n2
:
For example, where N = 1000; F = 400; n1 = :5; n2 = 1=3;n3 = 1=6, with the estimated
b 1 = 5:836; b 2 =  5:895 would give f
1 = :37;f
2 = :41;f




The same type of optimization can be performed taking into account the heterogeneity in ability,
as well as changing the number and size of the classrooms. One would need to take into account
the actual joint distributions of the choice variables. Further, although we xed the student body
in this exercise, nothing prevents an institution from adjusting along several dimensions subject to
some budget constraints. For example, from our analysis it is obvious that a larger share of women
would benet the overall performance. Given the estimated parameters, the share of females which
maximizes performance is given by the ratio  
c 1
2c 2
 :495 while the current share of women is :42.
327 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the eects of two controversial policies, class size and class composi-
tion, on student performance in school and in the labor market. We contribute to a large literature
on policy interventions designed to improve student outcomes by adopting a novel approach that
diers from most of the existing research in four important ways. First, we focus on university
education rather than primary or secondary schooling. Because the pedagogy, average class size,
and student population dier in important ways between university and pre-university education, we
believe that these results provide evidence more directly applicable to higher education. In addition,
Heckman (2007) argues that interventions early in life are likely to have larger impacts on the devel-
opment of human capital than are interventions later in life, raising the possibility that eectiveness
of educational interventions may dier between pre-tertiary and a university settings. Second, we
rely on random variation in the size and composition of the classes. Such randomization was not
the intended purpose of the administrators, hence our design helps avoiding concerns that teachers
and students alter their behavior because of the experiment itself: the Hawthorne eect. Third, our
paper studies the impact of class size and student heterogeneity on labor market outcomes rather
than just on test scores. Finally, we provide a useful example on the construction of the optimal
class composition.
Our results suggest four ndings. First, class size has a small but substantial impact on student
academic performance. A reduction in class size by 20 students increases the average grade by 0.1
standard deviations. Second, we show that the eect of class size on student performance is larger
for men and for lower-income students. Third, we show that a larger share of females has, up to
a certain threshold, a positive impact on average grades, i.e. performance is inverse U-shaped in
the share of females. The same can be said in terms of ability heterogeneity: some heterogeneity
improves the average performance, but a very heterogeneous class is detrimental. In contrast, we
nd no evidence that heterogeneity in family income has an eect on performance.
Finally, we turn to labor market outcomes. Our baseline results suggest that increasing class size
by 20 students reduces a student's wage by approximately 6 percent. Given this estimate, it would
33be hard to dismiss class size reduction as an ineective and inecient policy. Suppose that the 1,500
students at Bocconi were divided in 14 rather than the actual 12 classes, so that average class size
would be reduced by 20 students. Such an intervention would generate a gain of 80 euros per month
 1,500 students, or 120,000 euros in total each month, which are likely to be more than enough
to pay the costs of acquiring the additional resources necessary to activate the two extra classes.
Further, we provide evidence that a zero-cost intervention, e.g. reshuing the class composition in
terms of share of females would increase overall average performance.
34References
[1] Angrist, Joshua and Lavy, Victor, (1999), \Using Maimonides' Rule to Estimate the Eect of
Class Size on Scholastic Achievement," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114: 533-575.
[2] Arellano, Manuel, (2003), Panel Data Econometrics. Oxford University Press.
[3] Bandiera, Oriana, Larcinese, Valentino, and Rasul, Imran, (2008), \Heterogeneous Class Size
Eects: New Evidence from a Panel of University Students," forthcoming, the Economic Jour-
nal.
[4] Betts, Julian, (1995), \Does School Quality Matter? Evidence from the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth," Review of Economics and Statistics, 77: 231-247.
[5] Campbell, Ernest, Coleman, James, Hobson, Carol, McPartland, James, Mood, Alexander, We-
infeld, Frederic and York, Robert, (1966), \Equality of Educational Opportunity," Washington
DC: U.S. Government Printing Oce.
[6] Card, David. and Krueger, Alan., (1992), \Does School Quality Matter? Returns to Education
and the Characteristics of Public Schools in the United States," Journal of Political Economy,
100: 1-40.
[7] Card, David. and Krueger, Alan., (1996), \School Resources and Student Outcomes: An
Overview of the Literature and New Evidence from North and South Carolina," The Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives, 10: 31-50.
[8] Carrell, Scott, Fullerton, Richard. and West, James, (2009a): \Does Your Cohort Matter?
Estimating Peer Eects in College Achievement," Journal of Labor Economics, 27, 439-464.
[9] Carrell, Scott, Sacerdote, Bruce and West, James, (2009b), \Beware of Economists Bearing
the Reduced Forms? An Experiment in How Not To Improve Student Outcomes," mimeo
UC-Davis.
[10] Cooley, Jane, (2009), \Desegregation and the Achievement Gap: Do Diverse Peers Help?"
mimeo University of Wisconsin-Madison.
35[11] Dearden, Lorraine, Ferri, Javier and Meghir, Costas, (2002), \The Eect of School Quality on
Educational Attainment and Wages," Review of Economics and Statistics, 84, 1-20.
[12] De Giorgi, Giacomo, Redaelli, Silvia and Pellizzari, Michele, (2009), \Be as Careful of the Books
You Read as of the Company You Keep. Evidence on Peer Eects in Educational Choices,"
NBER DP: 14948.
[13] De Giorgi, Giacomo and Pellizzari, Michele, (2009), \Understanding Peer Eects," mimeo Stan-
ford University.
[14] Dobblesteen, Simone, Levin, Jesse and Oosterbeek, Hessel, (2002), \The Causal Eect of Class
Size on Scholastic Achievement: Distinguishing the Pure Class Size Eect from the Eect of
Changes in Class Composition," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 64, 17-38.
[15] Duo, Ester, Dupas, Pascaline and Kremer, Michael, (2008), \Peer Eects and the Impact of
Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya," forthcoming, American Eco-
nomic Review.
[16] Duo, Ester, Dupas, Pascaline and Kremer, Michael, (2009): \Inputs versus Accountability:
Experimental Evidence from Kenya," mimeo UCLA.
[17] Figlio, David and Page, Marianne, (2002), \School Choice and the Distributional Eects of
Ability Tracking: Does Separation Increase Inequality?" Journal of Urban Economics, 51: 497-
514.
[18] Gneezy, Uri, Niederle, Muriel and Rustichini, Aldo, (2003), \Performance in Competitive En-
vironments: Gender Dierences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118: 1049 - 1074.
[19] Gruber, Jonathan (2001), \Tobacco at the Crossroads: The Past and Future of Smoking Reg-
ulation in the United States," The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 15: 193-212.
[20] Guryan, Jonathan, Kroft, Korry and Notowidigo, Matthew, (2009), \Peer Eects in the Work-
place: Evidence from Random Groupings in Professional Golf Tournaments," forthcoming AEJ:
Applied.
36[21] Hanushek, Eric, (1996), \School Resources" in Eric A. Hanushek and Finis Welch (ed.), Hand-
book of the Economics of Education, Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[22] Hanushek, Eric, (2006) \School Resources" in E. Hanushek and F. Welch (ed.) Handbook of
the Economics of Education. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
[23] Hanushek, Eric, Kain, John and Rivkin, Steven, (1995), \Teachers, Schools, and Academic
Achievement," Econometrica, 73: 417-458.
[24] Heckman, James, (2007). \The Economics, Technology, and Neuroscience of Human Capability
Formation," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 104: 13250{13255.
[25] Heckman, James, Layne-Farrar, Anne, and Todd, Petra, (1996), \Human Capital Pricing Equa-
tions with an Application to Estimating the Eect of Schooling Quality on Earnings," Review
of Economics and Statistics, 78: 562-610.
[26] Hoxby, Caroline, (1998), \The Eects of Class Size and Composition on Student Achievement:
New Evidence from Natural Population Variation," NBER Working Paper 6869.
[27] Hoxby, Caroline, (2000), \The Eects of Class Size on Student Achievement: New Evidence
from Population Variation," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4): 1239-1285.
[28] Imbens, Guido, and Angrist, Joshua, (1994), \Identication and Estimation of Local Average
Treatment Eects," Econometrica, 62: 467-475.
[29] Jackson, Mathew, (2008) \Social and Economic Networks," Princeton: Princeton University
Press.
[30] Johnson, George and Staord, Frank, (1973), \Social Returns to Quantity and Quality of
Schooling," Journal of Human Resources 8: 139-155.
[31] Krueger, Alan, (1999), \Experimental Estimates of Education Production Functions Experi-
mental Estimates of Education Production Functions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
114: 497-532.
37[32] Krueger, Alan, Whitmore, Diane, (2001), \The Eect of Attending a Small Class in the Early
Grades on College-Test Taking and Middle School Test Results: Evidence from Project STAR,"
The Economic Journal, 111(468): 1-28.
[33] Lazear, Edward, (2001): \Educational Production," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol.
116: 777-803
[34] Ludwig, Jens, Duncan, Greg and Hirscheld, Paul, (2001), \Urban Poverty and Juvenile Crime:
Evidence from a Randomized Housing-Mobility," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116:
655-679.
[35] Manning, Alan and Pischke, J orn-Steen, (2006), \Comprehensive versus Selective Schooling
in England and Wales: What do we Know?" NBER WP: 12176.
[36] Mott, Robert, (1996), \Symposium on School Quality and Educational Outcomes: Introduc-
tion," The Review of Economics and Statistics, 78: 559-561.
[37] OECD, (2009), Education at a Glance 2008, Paris.
[38] Oyer, Paul, (2006), "Initial Labor Market Conditions and Long-Term Outcomes for
Economists," Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20: 143-160.
[39] Pinto Machado, Matilde and Vera-Hernandez, Marcos, (2009): \Peer Eects and Class Size in
College," mimeo UCL.
[40] Schubert, Renate, Brown, Martin, Gysler, Matthias and Brachinger, Hans (1999), \Financial
Decision-Making: Are Women Really More Risk-Averse?" The American Economic Review,
89: 381-385.
[41] Sloan, Frank, Reilly, Bridget, Schenzler, Christoph, (1995), \Eects of Tort Liability and In-
surance on Heavy Drinking and Drinking and Driving," Journal of Law and Economics, 38:
49-77.
38Table 1. Students' descriptive statistics 
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
1=female 0.42 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50)
1=high income 0.22 (0.42) 0.22 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42)
entry test score 65.18 (15.85) 73.39 (13.85) 56.26 (12.77)
gpa 26.00 (2.33) 25.65 (2.40) 26.39 (2.20)
entry wage 1,303.37 (483.73) 1,242.88 (391.93) 1,358.38 (548.76)
Notes: High income families (above 90 thousands euros of gross yearly income, corresponding to approximately 
140,000 USD) pay the maximum fee, hence they are not required to report their actual income to the university 
administration. Entry wages are originally recorded in intervals. The statistics reported here refer to an imputed 
measure of wages computed at the mid-point of the interval indicated by the respondent. All monetary values are in 
euros at current prices.
All students 2000 Cohort 2001 CohortTable 2. Classes' descriptive statistics
Academic year:
Degree program Cohort: 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001
Economics mean 92 61 92 63 85 56 75 91 69 90 72 90 74 81
std.dev. 3.09 9.37 2.12 7.68 2.12 1.94 16.28 0.80 8.22 1.62 8.49 2.47 0.71 10.73
m i n 9 05 49 05 88 45 55 4 9 16 48 96 68 87 36 4
m a x 9 56 79 36 88 75 89 5 9 27 59 27 89 27 49 3
Management mean 138 131 133 137 129 132 133 133 145 130 162 131 162 144
std.dev. 7.11 9.34 4.01 4.67 2.31 4.99 6.53 6.87 10.20 3.19 4.25 1.87 0.83 14.84
min 124 113 127 132 126 125 113 119 125 126 157 129 161 119
max 146 142 140 147 132 138 147 142 155 136 168 133 164 168
Economics and mean 153 140 157 151 151 141 149 145 154 157 171 156 171 159
Finance std.dev. 3.62 2.39 1.82 0.71 2.63 1.41 6.92 0.80 2.12 4.44 0.81 3.74 0.81 9.86
min 151 138 156 150 150 140 138 145 152 153 170 154 170 145
max 156 142 158 151 153 142 158 146 155 160 172 159 172 172
third
Overall Overall
Students count Officially enrolled students
first second third first second
Total mean 133 121 130 127 125 121 126 128 133 128 148 128 149 136
std.dev. 20.77 29.32 20.45 30.68 20.78 30.68 25.39 18.63 31.36 20.40 35.97 20.42 35.33 28.56
m i n 9 05 49 05 88 45 55 4 9 16 48 96 68 87 36 4
max 156 142 158 151 153 142 158 146 155 160 172 159 172 172
Notes: The students count is the number of students in any given cohort and year who have the same class identifier.  The officially enrolled students is the number of students who were 
allocated to the same class by the university administration at the beginning of each academic year.  2000 corresponds to the 1999/2000 cohort, while 2001 corresponds to the 2000/2001 
cohort. One observation per class (72 cells in total).Table 3. Descriptive statistics of class composition
Variable 2000 2001 2000 2001 2000 2001
Female mean 0.364 0.42 0.364 0.437 0.371 0.441 0.399
s.d. 0.059 0.0682 0.064 0.0764 0.0724 0.0695 0.074
min 0.237 0.299 0.209 0.318 0.226 0.323 0.209
max 0.445 0.527 0.429 0.567 0.511 0.525 0.567
High-income mean 0.227 0.242 0.231 0.241 0.232 0.243 0.236
s.d. 0.0441 0.0554 0.0466 0.0477 0.0357 0.0535 0.046
min 0.13 0.148 0.161 0.156 0.201 0.123 0.123
max 0.298 0.318 0.316 0.322 0.298 0.343 0.343
SD Entry test mean 0.21 0.244 0.208 0.243 0.208 0.24 0.226
s.d. 0.0261 0.0172 0.0242 0.0153 0.0222 0.0152 0.026
min 0.169 0.22 0.172 0.215 0.163 0.215 0.163
max 0.248 0.278 0.249 0.271 0.24 0.263 0.278






% of top income
Panel A: F-test of equality of means across classes:
Notes: One observation per class (72 cells in total). SD Entry test is the within class standard deviation in the entry test 
scores.
















Notes: The F-tests reported in Panel A are derived from regressions of the mean characteristics 
of the class on dummies for the class identifiers, controlling for cohort and academic year fixed 
effects. The coefficients reported in Panel B come  from regressions run at the class level (72 
obervations) with the average class characteristic on the LHS and the measure of class size on 
the RHS. All regressions include the full set of three-way interactions of cohort, degree program 
and academic year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
















Panel A: Ft e s t  of equality of means across classes:









(0.471)Table 5. Class-size effects on academic performance
No FE OLS IV RF
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Student count -0.012 -0.010* -0.017* -
(0.008) (0.005) (0.009)
[0.181] [0.069] [0.060]
Enrolled students - - -0.014*
(0.007)
[0.061]
Observations 4,810 4,810 4,810
F-stats - 241.87 -
Linear specification
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by cohort-program-class-year cells. Corresponding p-values in 
square parentheses. Clustering at the cohort-program-class level produces very similar standard errors to the ones 
reported in the table. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Table 6. Heterogeneous effects of class-size on students' academic performance
OLS IV RF
[1] [2] [3]
Student count -0.003 -0.031 -
(0.012) (0.025)
[0.785] [0.216]
Test score x Student count 0.000 0.000 -
(0.000) (0.000)
[0.439] [0.858]
Female x Student count 0.001 0.023** -
(0.006) (0.009)
[0.885] [0.013]
High income x Student count 0.005 0.026** -
(0.006) (0.010)
[0.393] [0.007]
Enrolled students - - -0.020
(0.013)
[0.135]
Test score x Enrolled students - - 0.000
(0.000)
[0 813] [0.813]
Female x Enrolled students - - 0.010***
(0.003)
[0.003]
High income x Enrolled students - - 0.012***
(0.003)
[0.001]
Observations 4,810 4,810 4,810
F-stats - 64.28; 51.62; 
62.86; 84.22
-
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by cohort-program-class-year cells. Corresponding 
p-values in square parentheses. Clustering at the cohort-program-class level produces very similar 
standard errors to the ones reported in the table. Table 7. The effects of class heterogeneity on academic performance
OLS IV RF OLS IV RF
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Student count -0.009 -0.018* - -0.012** -0.020* -
(0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.011)
[0.127] [0.079] [0.050] [0.069]
Heterogeneity of actual classmates:
Mean test score in the class 0.034 -0.037 - 0.033 -0.033 -
(0.022) (0.035) (0.023) (0.035)
[0.128] [0.286] [0.150] [0.337]
-1.729 -2.522 - 37.633** 26.375 -
(1.454) (1.897) (15.861) (26.986)
[0.240] [0.184] [0.022] [0.328]
[SD test] squared - - - -85.994** -63.646 -
(33.711) (56.855)
[0.014] [0.263]
1.402*** 1.517** - 5.836** 8.737** -
(0.483) (0.648) (2.883) (3.737)
[0.006] [0.019] [0.049] [0.019]
[% female] squared - - - -5.895* -9.161** -
(3.432) (4.578)
[0.092] [0.045]
-1.633* 0.087 - -3.026 0.942 -
(0.877) (0.734) (5.161) (6.964)
[0.069] [0.905] [0.560] [0.892]
[% high-income] squared - - - 3.704 -1.072 -
(10.282) (14.219)
[0.720] [0.940]
Enrolled students - - -0.014* - - -0.014*
(0 008) (0 008)
Quadratic effects Linear effects
Percentage of females in the class 
[% female]
S.d. of (log) test scores in the class 
[SD test]
gg




Heterogeneity of officially enrolled students:
Mean test score in the class - - -0.034 - - -0.026
(0.024) (0.023)
[0.103] [0.264]
- - -2.020 - - 9.388
(1.578) (14.260)
[0.223] [0.514]
[ S D  t e s t ]  s q u a r e d ----- - 2 5 . 3 1 4
(30.684)
[0.414]
- - 1.203** - - 8.648**
(0.489) (3.321)
[0.003] [0.012]
S h a r e  o f  f e m a l e s  s q u a r e d ----- - 9 . 470**
(4.246)
[0.031]
- - -0.235 - - -0.535
(0.577) (4.492)
[0.042] [0.906]
Share of high-income squared ----- 0 . 7 7 3
(8.011)
[0.923]
Observations 4,810 4,810 4,810 4,810 4,810 4,810
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by cohort-program-class-year cells. Corresponding p-values in square 
parentheses. Clustering at the cohort-program-class level produces very similar standard errors to the ones reported in the table. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: The first stage F-tests of the excluded instruments are the following. For the model in column 2: 41.61; 210.57; 61.82; 
223.83; 101.51. For the model in column 3: 36.54; 149.62; 52.53; 50.69; 127.38; 86.00; 66.71; 81.49
Share of high income students in 
the class 
Share of females in the class
S.d. of (log) test scores in the class 
[SD test]Table 8. Class-size effects on Wages
OLS IV RF OLS IV RF
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10]
Average student count -4.239* - -4.602** -3.206 - -3.927* - -4.285* -2.858 -
(2.334) (2.343) (2.551) (2.295) (2.303) (2.512)
[0.069] [0.050] [0.209] [0.069] [0.063] [0.255]
Average enrolled students - -2.404 - - -2.257 - -2.154 - - -2.012
(1.761) (1.802) (1.738) (1.776)
[0.172] [0.211] [0.215] [0.258]
G r a d u a t i o n  m a r k ----- 9 . 337*** 9.357*** 9.076*** 9.106*** 9.110***
(2.131) (2.137) (1.961) (1.952) (1.968)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075 1,075
F-stats - - - 1,937.86 ---- 1 , 933.89 -
Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by cohort-program-class cells Corresponding p-values in square parentheses
Interval regression Interval regression
Notes: all models include the following set of controls: gender, entry test score, high school final grade, high school type, family income, original residence, cohort, degree 
program, survey wave.
Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by cohort-program-class cells. Corresponding p-values in square parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Figure 1. Variation in Class Size
Notes: The darker and lighter bars indicate the density (left axis) of the different class sizes 
measured as Students count and  Enrolled respectively. Dashed lines of corresponding colors 
indicate the averages of the two variables. The small x's in the graph show the percentage 
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